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No More Secrets: Under Ballard v. Commissioner,
Special Trial Judge Reports Must Be Revealed
By Katherine Kmiec Turner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's determination that the Tax Court cannot
keep its special trial judge reports secret is a "twist in a series of
revelations that have shaken the foundations of the U.S. Tax Court
and raised questions about the credibility of the court's decision-
making process . . . ." On the surface, Ballard v. Commissioner2
appears to be a simple case. The Tax Court interpreted its own rules
to permit secrecy of the initial reports written by special trial judges,
who are lower level Tax Court judges that make findings of fact and
then pass the case on to a regular Tax Court judge.3 The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that the only possible way to keep these
reports secret is to rewrite the Tax Court rules.4 While issues of due
process were continually brought up, the Supreme Court ultimately
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. Maurice Possley, Judges set aside Tax Court ruling; Decision a victory for
late Chicago lawyer, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 2005, at BI. This article was written in
response to the Supreme Court decision in Ballard v. Conm 'r, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).
It traces the history of the case and does further independent research regarding
how many "Tax Court judges secretly changed the findings of lower-level trial
judges... over the past decade." Possley, at B1.
2. Ballard v. Comm'r, 544 U.S. 40 (2005). This case was argued on Dec. 7,
2004 and on March 5, 2005 was decided in favor of Petitioners, two businessmen
accused of fraud. Id.
3. Ballard v. Comm'r, 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2003); Estate of Kanter v.
Comm'r, 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2003).
4. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 64-66. Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority,
states: "The idiosyncratic procedure the Commissioner describes and defends,
although not the system of adjudication that Rule 183 currently creates, is one the
Tax Court might some day adopt." Id. at 65.
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based its determination on the statutory interpretation of the role of a
special trial judge.5 The impact of Ballard is so strong that the
authority of "the whole administrative array of the federal
government" is affected by its outcome.6  As the petition for
certiorari points out, "[t]he [q]uestions [p]resented are of [m]anifest
[n]ational [i]mportance . . . [t]he implications of this case stretch far
beyond the Tax Court context."7 This case struggles to balance two
essential aspects of administrative law: (1) the ability of the agency
to have the deference and authority to write and interpret its own
rules without Article III court interference; and (2) the ability of a
party to be able to see what its initial findings of fact are to give
confidence in the administrative procedure and allow for a
meaningful appeal.
This case note evaluates Ballard, its roots, and its impact on the
Tax Court and administrative agencies. First, the history of the
United States Tax Court is provided with a focus on the special trial
judges and the structure of Tax Court Rule 183 that was the central
focus of Ballard.8 Second, there is a brief comparison of other
5. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40 (Nos. 03-184,
03-1034) for a question posed by Justice O'Connor: "There also are due process
allegations, and I'm not sure I even quite understand what the precise due process
violation is that's alleged. But I would like you to address both and to tell us, first
of all, how it would be resolved solely on a statutory basis from your perspective."
Arguing on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. Shapiro stated: "The readiest ground for
decision is the statutory basis, and we believe that the statute is a good means to
avoid a complex due process question." Id.
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40, No. 03-184, 2003
WL22428707 (2004). Although the case only directly affects the Tax Court by
forcing it upon remand to interpret its rules in a particular way, the ability of
administrative agencies and courts to make their own rules and interpret them are
threatened by this case. The public's confidence in the administrative process is
tested by this case as well. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 15-72; TAx CT. R. 183 (as amended 2005); see infra notes
15-72 and accompanying text. Rule 183 (a) is a Tax Court rule that authorizes
special trial judges to conduct certain trials assigned to them by the Chief Tax
Court Judge. Rule 183(b) requires that the special trial judge make a report of its
findings of fact. Rule 183(c) requires that the regular Tax Court judge give
deference to the findings of fact made by the special trial judge and either accept,
modify, or reject the special trial judge report. TAx CT. R. 183(a)-(c). See also
Brief of the Petitioner on the Merits, Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40, 2004 WL 2004 WL
2336550 (2004).
positions, such as a magistrate, to the special trial judge. 9 Third, this
article simplifies the complicated, prior history of Ballard that
includes three different petitioners, weeks of trial, and numerous
courts proceedings and opinions.' ° Fourth, the Ballard opinion is
analyzed in detail, separately describing the majority opinion
authored by Justice Ginsberg," the concurring opinion authored by
Justice Kennedy, 12 and the dissenting opinion authored by the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist.13  Finally, there is an explanation of
Ballard's effect on the taxpayers involved, the effect on the Tax
Court rules and practices, and the impact it will have on "the whole
administrative array of the federal government.,
14
A. The United States Tax Court
1. Authority and Jurisdiction of the Tax Court
The United States Tax Court is a federal court established under
the authority granted to Congress in Article I of the United States
Constitution. 5 Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress
9. See infra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text. There are currently
twenty-two cases listed in the direct history of Ballard. For a simple, graphical
representation of all of the cases involved in Ballard, look at the Westlaw Direct
History graphic depiction by looking up Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40 and clicking on the
"Direct History" (graphical view in the left-hand column).
11. See infra notes 124-198 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 212-223 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 224-268 and accompanying text. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 8, supra note 7.
15. United States Tax Court, About the Court, at
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm (last visited April 12, 2006). See also Ex
Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) (recognizing Article I power to
establish legislative courts, specifically dealing with consular courts and the Court
of Claims). Cf CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NATIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS (Aspen
Publishers 3rd ed. 2004), (stating that the argument against non-Article III courts is
that Article III courts are not distinct from Article III courts and "[t]he complete
independence of the courts of justice is particularly essential in a limited
constitution" (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
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has the authority to create courts that do not fall under its Article III
power. 16 This power was judicially acknowledged in 1828 when the
Supreme Court authorized "legislative Courts, created in virtue of the
general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in
virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful
rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United
States."' 7
The Tax Court was originally established to resolve the numerous
disputes taxpayers have with the government. 18 This is a unique
court that the government, specifically the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), has special interest in because the
government is always a party to a claim. 19 Taxpayers have the right
to dispute their tax claims in either the U.S. District Courts, the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims, the U.S. Tax Court or possibly the
Bankruptcy Court.20 There are two major differences that distinguish
the Tax Court from the U.S. District Courts and the Court of Federal
16. See American Ins. Co. v. Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828)
(holding that the Constitution permits Congress to enact laws that are necessary and
proper for execution of its powers). Congress has set up numerous other Article 1
courts including: U.S. Court of Federal Claims, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, D.C. municipal court
system, U.S. bankruptcy courts, and the U.S. district courts for the districts of
Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Stephen C. Gara,
Challenging the Finality of Tax Court Judgments: When Is Final Not Really Final?
20 AKRON TAX J. 35, 57 (2005).
17. American Ins. Co., 26 U.S. at 546 (approving formation of an admiralty
court as a legislative court).
18. Gara, supra note 16, at 38.
The Supreme Court has generally limited Congress' authority to
establish Article I courts to four areas: (1) U.S. possessions and
territories, (2) military affairs, (3) civil disputes between private
parties and the United States, and (4) other areas where the
Article I court serves merely as an adjunct to an Article III court
who oversees the former's actions. The United States Tax Court
falls into category three, resolving civil tax disputes between
private parties (taxpayers) and the United States (Internal
Revenue Service).
Id. (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 181-82 (Little Brown &
Co. 1989) and Bums, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 392, 396 (T.C.
1971)).
19. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5.
20. Mervyn S. Gerson, et. al., Dealing with Tax Disputes, 2-JUL HAW. B.J. 6.
claims. First, as will be discussed below, the Tax Court is the only
forum where a taxpayer can file suit and challenge the amount being
demanded from the IRS before paying the amount.2' Second, the
Tax Court is an Article I court while the other two courts are Article
111.22
The implications of the distinction between Article I and Article
III courts are significant. First, under Article I, Tax Court judges do
not receive life tenure; rather, the nineteen Tax Court judges are
appointed to fifteen-year terms.23 Second, Article I courts do not
receive a constitutionally protected and guaranteed salary.24  Third,
as an Article I court, the Tax Court has a narrow jurisdiction defined
by Congress to keep these courts from encroaching on Article III
court jurisdiction. 25
21. To be heard by the Tax Court, taxpayers have to file a petition stating that
they disagree with the Commissioner's determination of their tax deficiency. They
also pay a $60 filing fee.
Cases are calendared for trial as soon as practicable (on a first in/
first out basis) after the case becomes at issue. When a case is
calendared, the parties are notified by the Court of the date, time,
and place of trial. Trials are conducted before one judge, without
a jury, and taxpayers are permitted to represent themselves if
they desire. Taxpayers may be represented by practitioners
admitted to the bar of the Tax Court.
About the Court, supra note 15.
22. Gara, supra note 16 at 37-38.
23. 26 USCS § 7443(a) ("The Tax Court shall be composed of 19 members.").
Article I Court judges do receive life tenure. DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET. AL, THE
HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2nd
ed. 2004).
24. Gara, supra note 16 at 37-38; see also May, supra note 15.
25. Burns, Stix Friedman & Co., 57 T.C. at 396. This Tax Court case states:
The Court presently has no jurisdiction to execute its decisions; it
does not render a monetary judgment; it simply determines the
amount of the deficiency or overpayment of tax. The Tax Court
has only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by statute. It has
no jurisdiction to exercise the broad common law concept of
"judicial power" invested in courts of general jurisdiction by
article III of the Constitution. If the jurisdiction and function
presently vested in the Tax Court could be exercised
constitutionally by an "independent agency within the Executive
Branch," there is little reason to believe that Congress could not
constitutionally delegate that jurisdiction to a "legislative court."
Id. (quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
Spring 2006 No More Secrets
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The jurisdiction of the Tax Court includes the authority to hear
tax disputes concerning notices of deficiency, notices of transferee
liability, certain types of declaratory judgment, readjustment and
adjustment of partnership items, review of the failure to abate
interest, administrative costs, worker classification, relief from joint
and several liability on a joint return, and review of certain collection
actions. ' 2 6
2. Creation of the Tax Court
In 1924, the executive branch created an independent agency to
permit taxpayers to challenge the IRS before they had to pay the debt
owed.2 7 At the time, the agency was called the Board of Tax
Appeals, but its name was changed to the "Tax Court" in 1942.28
Shortly after its creation, Congress ruled that the decision of the tax
board "judges" had to be reviewed by an appellate district court.29 In
1969, under the Tax Reform Act, the Tax Court status was increased
and its role was solidified by statute.30 This act changed the court
from being considered an executive, independent agency to being
called an Article I, legal court called the "United States Tax Court."
31
26. About the Court, supra note 15.
27. Rev. Act of 1924, ch. 234, 900, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253, 336-38
(1924). At this time, the IRS was called the Bureau of Inland Revenue. When the
bill was signed, President Coolidge stated: "'The provisions of the bill ... with
reference to the Board, make it in its essentials practically a court of record."'
Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened
Appellate Deference To Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REv. 235,
280 (1998).
28. Rev. Act of 1942, ch. 619, 504(a), Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798, 957
(1942). Tax Court Chairman Murdock explained the change as appropriate
because it "'validate[d] the generally recognized view that the Board was a court in
everything but name."' Johnson, supra note 27, at 281.
29. Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, 1001(a), 1002, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9,
109-10 (1926).
30. When changing the Tax Court to an Article I court, the legislative history
explained that "[s]ince the Tax Court has only judicial duties, the committee
believes it is anomalous to continue to classify it with quasi-judicial executive
agencies that have rulemaking and investigatory functions." S. REP. No. 91-552
(1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2341. See also Johnson, supra
note 27, at 281.
31. Johnson, supra note 27, at 39.
There is an ongoing dispute regarding whether the Tax Court
should be treated like an administrative agency because it was
established as such, or if it should be treated strictly as a tribunal
court of law. In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court
majority clarified that the court is considered an Article I court;
however, the minority view rears its head, continually echoing the
fact that the tax court was originally an executive administrative
agency and should be treated as such. 32 While all nine Justices in
Freytag agree that the special trial judges are "inferior [o]fficers," 33
five Justices stated that the Tax Court is a "Court of Law" under the
appointments clause, while the other four justices argue that the Tax
Court is a "Department." 34 A thoughtful discussion of the Freytag
case states the following:
The majority held that "Courts of Law" are not required to be
Article III courts, and that the tax court is a "Court of Law," because
its function is essentially judicial, being "neither advocate nor rule
maker." The concurrence equated "Court of Law," with Article III
courts, but considered the tax court to be a Department, and noted
that the Constitution does not require departments to be those
cabinet-level agencies headed by a secretary. Moreover, the
concurrence noted that Article I courts and administrative agencies,
however judicial their decision-making may appear, cannot and do
not exercise the judicial power of the United States. Instead, they
exercise executive power. Both opinions in Freytag recognize that
non-Article III courts function substantially the same as Article III
courts.3 5
The operations of the court remained almost identical to the pre-
1969 Tax Court; however, because they are now considered Article I,
legal court judges rather than officers of an administrative agency,
the judges hold more judicial power, such as the ability to hold
32. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (holding that as inferior officers they
must be appointed by "Heads of the Departments" or the "Courts of Law").
33. Id. at 882; see also id. at 901 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 883 (majority opinion).
35. Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality Of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 91, 104, n.98 (1994) (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868) (internal citations
omitted).
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parties in contempt.36 Additionally, the right of parties to have the
Tax Court decisions reviewed by the U.S. District Courts was
affirmed in this Act.37
3. Organization of the Tax Court
The Tax Court is made up of nineteen judges appointed by the
President, one of whom serves as the Tax Court's Chief Judge. 38
These "regular" judges serve fifteen-year terms and receive a salary
established by statute.39 The Chief Judge has the right to assign a
"special trial judge" to perform the fact-finding in any case and be
the ultimate decision-maker in certain cases.40 It is the "Tax Court's
employment of special trial judges, auxiliary officers appointed by
the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to assist in the work of the court,"
that is at issue in Ballard.4 1
Once a determination has been made in favor of the IRS by either
the special trial court judge or the regular judge, any party has the
right to appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeal.42 The circuit court hearing
36. Gara, supra note 16 at 57, n.45 (citing Burns, Stix Friedman & Co., 57
T.C. at 395-96.).
37. Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, 1001(a), 1002.
38. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 48 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a)-(b), (e), A(a) (1980)).
See also About the Court, which gives the Tax Court's own description of the
organization as follows:
The Tax Court is composed of 19 members appointed by the
President. Trial sessions are conducted and other work of the
Court is performed by those judges, by senior judges serving on
recall, and by special trial judges. All of the judges have
expertise in the tax laws and apply that expertise in a manner to
ensure that taxpayers are assessed only what they owe, and no
more. Although the Court is physically located in Washington,
D.C., the judges travel nationwide to conduct trials in various
designated cities.
About the Court, supra note 15.
39. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 48 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a)-(b), (e), A(a)).
40. Id. at 48 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a)-(b), (e), A(a)).
41. Id. at 48; see also infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
42. I.R.C. §7482 (2000) (codified as 26 U.S.C.S. § 7482). This code states:
The United States Courts of Appeals (other than the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court,
the appeal treats as if it was coming directly from a regular U.S.
District Court trial.43
4. Rules of the Tax Court
Although Congress established the Tax Court and proscribed
general guidelines, the Tax Court has adopted its own procedural
rules.4 The rule that permits and regulates special trial judges and is
at issue in Ballard, Rule 183, is one of these self-established Tax
Court rules.4 5 The deference given to an Article I court to interpret
its self-determined rules is one of the major issues discussed in
Ballard.46  Currently, under the rule established in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., it is clear that administrative agencies
have the right to interpret their own rules and regulations within
except as provided in section 1254 of Title 28 of the United
States Code, in the same manner and to the same extent as
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a
jury; and the judgment of any such court shall be final, except
that it shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon certiorari, in the manner provided in section
1254 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
I.R.C. §7482.
43. Id.
44. TAX CT. R. 1 (codified as 26 U.S.C.A. 7453 (a)-(b) (2000)) ("The United
States Tax Court, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for
comment, may make and amend rules governing its practice and procedure.")
Section (a) explains the scope of the rule as follows:
These Rules govern the practice and procedure in all cases and
proceedings before the Court. Where in any instance there is no
applicable rule of procedure, the Court or the Judge before
whom the matter is pending may prescribe the procedure, giving
particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the
extent that they are suitably adaptable to govern the matter at
hand.
Id. at (b).
45. For a more detailed discussion of Tax Court Rule 183 and its impact on
the Tax Court see infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
46. The fact that Justice Rehnquist noted that the Tax Court interpreted its
rules to permit the report to remain secret is the entire rationale for his dissenting
opinion in Ballard, 544 U.S. at 68-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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reason.47 Bowles involved a dispute over a price administrator's
interpretation of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 that was issued
by the price administrator.48 The court stated that "[s]ince this
involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation . . . the
ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes
of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." 49 Whether this same deference should be
granted to an agency that was changed to an Article I court has not
been settled.50 It is clear that Congress granted the Tax Court
exclusive rulemaking authority under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) and 7453,
which should carry some weight in this argument.5 1 These statutes
permit the Tax Court to have a choice when interpreting ambiguity in
congressional rules relating to the Tax Court.52 When the Tax Court
became the official U.S. Tax Court and was elevated from an
executive agency to an Article I court in 1969, was its power to
interpret its own rules also diminished? 53
47. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
(discussing emergency price control laws); see also Ballard, 544 U.S. at 68-69.
48. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 413.
49. Id. at413-14.
50. See Ballard, 544 U.S. at 68-69. The late Chief Justice argued that
"[t]hough the Tax Court is an Article I court and not an executive agency, there is
no reason why Seminole Rock deference does not extend to the Tax Court's
interpretation of its own procedural rules. Further, Justice O'Connor in the
majority acknowledges that "the Tax Court is not without leeway in interpreting its
own Rules." Ballard, 544 U.S. at 60 (majority opinion).
51. 26 U.S.C.S. § 7443A(a) states: "The chief judge may, from time to time,
appoint special trial judges who shall proceed under such rules and regulations as
may be promulgated by the Tax Court." 26 U.S.C.S. § 7453 states:
Except in the case of proceedings conducted under section
7436(c) or 7463 [26 U.S.C.S. § 7436(c) or 7463], the
proceedings of the Tax Court and its divisions shall be conducted
in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other
than rules of evidence) as the Tax Court may prescribe and in
accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in trials without
a jury in the United States District Court of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
52. Brief for Respondent at 33, Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40.
53. See also Freytag 501 U.S. at 911-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (stating that that Tax Court should be characterized as an
independent agency because it was once an executive agency); Rev. Act of 1924,
5. Special Trial Judges
In 1943, before the Tax Court was considered an Article I court,
it created "special trial judges," which were later called
"commissioners." 54 The chief judge of the Tax Court was granted
authority to "from time to time, appoint [these] special trial judges."55
The Special trial judges do not have set terms like the regular fifteen-
year renewable term tax court judges.56 The special trial judges have
a set salary of 90% of what the regular tax court judges receive. 57
While there is very little litigation regarding special trial judges, 58
in 1991, the Supreme Court ruled that the special trial judges are
"constitutionally recognized 'officers,"' and that the Chief Tax Judge
is within his authority to assign cases to the special trial judges.59
Pub. L. No. 68-176, tit. IX, section 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336 (1924). 501 U.S. at 911-
12.
54. Rev. Act of 1943, ch. 63, sec. 503(b), 58 Stat. 72. See also Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6. In 1979, the Tax Court changed the name from
"commissioners" to "special trial judges." Ballard, 544 U.S. at 49 n.4.
55. 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(a). According to this rule:
The chiefjudge may assign
(1) any declaratory judgment proceeding,
(2) any proceeding under section 7463 [26 U.S.C.S. § 7463],
(3) any proceeding where neither the amount of the deficiency
placed in dispute (within the meaning of section 7463 [26
U.S.C.S. § 7463]) nor the amount of any claimed overpayment
exceeds $ 50,000,
(4) any proceeding under section 6320 or 6330 [26 U.S.C.S. §
6320 or 6330], and
(5) any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate, to
be heard by the special trial judges of the court.
§ 7443A(b).
56. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 48.
57. Id.
58. Under a LexisNexis search of all state and federal cases, there are only
twenty-five cases that have "special trial judge(s)" in the Lexis Headnotes. Under a
WestLaw search, there are only twenty-one cases that have "special trial judge(s)"
in the KeyCite Notes (searches last conducted on Jan. 30, 2006).
59. Honorable James P. Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal
Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 629, 657 (citing Freytag, 501
U.S. at 868).
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Special trial judges can "hear and render final decisions in
declaratory judgment proceedings, 'small tax cases,' and levy and
lien proceedings." 60 If a case is worth over $50,000, the Tax Court
follows a two-tier process because the special trial court "lack[s]
authority to enter final decision" in these cases. 61
In 1944, just one year after special trial judges were created, the
special trial judges, who were then called "commissioners," were
required to write a special report discussing their findings. 62 From
1944 until 1983, under Rule 182(b) (the predecessor to Rule 183),
special trial judges reports were required to be published and served
upon the parties so that the parties could file exceptions to the special
trial judge report.63 The regular Tax Court judge was required to
give "[d]ue regard ...to the circumstance that the [s]pecial [t]rial
[j]udge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses. 64 Additionally, the special trial judge "shall be presumed
to be correct." After giving due regard and presuming that the report
is correct, the regular Tax Court judge is required to "adopt the
[s]pecial [t]rial [j]udge's report or .. .modify it or ...reject it in
whole or in part. 65
From 1944 through 1983, there were times when the regular Tax
Court judge disagreed with the fact-finding of the special trial judge
and the parties could see the discrepancies between the special trial
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Tax Court judge adopted the
finding of the special trial judge that the taxpayers were guilty of
failing to pay taxes on improper deductions that they claimed.
The taxpayers appealed, arguing that allowing special trial judges
to be assigned cases is a violation of the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that special trial
judges are constitutionally appointed "inferior officers" and have
the authority to hear the cases assigned to it.
Id.
60. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 48 (quoting § 7443A(b)(l)-(4), (c)); TAX CT. R. 182,
26 U.S.C. App. P. 1619; Brief of the Respondent on the Merits, Ballard, 540 U.S.
at 40, 2004 WL 2336550 (2004).
61. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
62. TAX CT. R. 48 (c) (July 1, 1948 ed.).
63. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6.
64. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 48 (quoting the current Tax Court Rule 183(b) that
was in effect when the special trial judges were created).
65. Id.
court judge and the regular Tax Court judge.66 In some of these
cases, the report was modified; the modified report was then
incorporated into the regular Tax Court judge's final decision. 67
In 1983, the Tax Court revised its rules and removed the
requirement that the special trial report had to be served upon the
parties and be put into the record.68 Rule 183(b) of the revised rules
states that the special trial judge "shall submit a report, including
findings of fact and opinion, to the Chief Judge, and the Chief Judge
will assign the case to a Judge ... of the Court."69 The new version
of the rules still maintained that the regular Tax Court judge must
give "due regard" to the Special Trial Court report and the regular tax
court judge must presume that "the findings of fact recommended by
the Special Trial Judge ... [are] correct." Since the 1983 rule went
into affect, no Tax Court judge has separately published the report of
the special trial judge or served it upon the parties. 70 Rather, every
judge simply states that he is adopting the report of the special trial
judge and only one report (which may or not be the same as the
special trial judge's report) is published. 71 The practice of each and
every Tax Court judge has been to keep the records sealed, even
upon appeal.72
66. Rosenbaum v. Comm'r, 45 TCM 825, 827 (1983).
67. Taylor v. Comm'r, 41 TCM 539 (1980).
68. TAx CT. R. 183(b) (1984 ed.). As the majority opinion in Ballard points
out, the Tax Court "does not maintain a formal practice of publicly disclosing
proposed amendments to its rules." Ballard, 125 S. Ct. at 1275, n.1. For a critical
comment on this practice, see Estate of Kanter v. Comm 'r, 337 F.3d 833, 877-78,
n.2 rev'd sub nom. Ballard, 544 U.S. 40 (2005) (stating that this practice is "oddly
out of sync with prevailing practice").
69. TAX CT. R. 183(b).
70. Since this decision, it has been determined that there have been 923 cases
that followed this procedure since 1983 and were neither published in the appellate
record nor given to the parties. Louise Story, Tax Court Lifts Secrecy, Putting
Some Cases in New Light, N.Y. TIMES, Sec. C, Sept. 24, 2005.
71. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 56 (quoting Kanter, 337 F.3d at 876; cf Transcript of
Oral Argument., supra note 5, at 44 ("Counsel for Commissioner, in response to
the Court's question, stated: 'We're not aware of any cases in which the [regular]
Tax Court judge has rejected the [special trial judge's] findings . . ".
72. Id. at 46.
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6. Similarity of Special Trial Judge Procedure to Other Positions in
Courts or Agencies
Each side in this case, as well as the judges ruling upon it, have
attempted to analogize the two-tiered proceedings of the tax court
with another established procedure within a court or agency. 3 A
brief look at some of the similarities and differences between these
examples and the tax court will assist in understanding Ballard.
a) Magistrate Judges
District courts have the ability to hire magistrates.74 A magistrate
judge makes findings and recommendations, and has the ability to
conduct a trial.75 The decisions of the magistrate judges can become
findings of the court without further review if there is no objection by
the parties. 76 Magistrate judges must follow the Fifth Amendment's
due process requirements by disclosing adjudicative fact finding.77
"The initial findings or recommendations of magistrate judges ... are
available to the appellate court authorized to review the operative
decision of the district court. '78 In addition to being available to the
appellate court, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), magistrate judges
73. All of the briefs filed in this case, the oral arguments and the final decision
compare or contrast the special trial court judge with another type of position that
falls below the authority of the "regular judge." See infra notes 73-98 for details
regarding different positions compared and contrasted.
74. 28 U.S.C. §631 (2000).
75. Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Leandra Lederman in Support of
Petitioners, (2004) (Nos. 03-184, 03-1034) (citing Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 638
F.2d 665, 669 (3d Cir. 1981) ("the special trial judge acts in a capacity not
dissimilar to that of a magistrate in district court")).
76. Brief of Respondent, supra note 60, at 34; Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140,
148-152 (1985). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(3); Kentucky v. Indiana, 474 U.S.
1, 1(1985)
77. Brief of Amici Curiae Senator David Pryor; Estate of Robert W. Lisle; and
Estate of Donna M. Lisle in Support of Petitioners, 2004 WL 1759878 (August 2,
2004) at 4.
78. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 61 (citing § 636(b)(1)(C)). This statute states that
"[t]he magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings and recommendations under
subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties."
§ 636(b)(1)(C).
are required to mail a copy of the report to the parties. 79  The
comparison to magistrate judges appears to be a strong one. In
Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, the special trial judge's duties were
compared to a magistrate.8 0  Further, in a Tax Note article, it was
pointed out that "[m]agistrate judges and special trial judges enjoy
the same constitutional status as 'inferior officers.'81
b) Special Masters
"The court after hearing may adopt the [special master's] report or
may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may receive
further evidence or may recommit it with instructions." 82  "The
initial findings or recommendations of. . .special masters ...are
available to the appellate court authorized to review the operative
decision of the district court."83 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
10(a) requires that "the original papers and exhibits filed in the
district court" be available to the appellate court.
84
c) Bankruptcy Court Judges
A bankruptcy judge files "proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law" in its initial report.85 "The initial findings or
recommendations of . . bankruptcy judges are available to the
appellate court authorized to review the operative decision of the
district court."86 The rule governing this process is Bankruptcy Rule
79. Id. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Senator David Pryor, supra note 77, at
5 n2.
80. Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Leandra Lederman, supra note 75, at 15
(citing Estate of Smith, 638 F.2d at 669).
81. Id. (quoting Kathleen Pakenham, You Better Shop Around: The Status and
Authority of Specialty Trial Judges in Federal Tax Cases, 103 TAX NOTES 1527,
1532 (June 21, 2004)).
82. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 66 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2)(amended 2003));
cf Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 (2004).
83. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 61 (citing FED. R. APp. P. 10(a)).
84. Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Leandra Lederman, supra note 75
(quoting 20 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 310.10 [1] (3d. ed. 1997)).
85. 2003 U.S. Briefs 184, 18 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2004) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
53(e)).
86. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 61 (citing FED. R. BKRTCY. P. 9033(a), (d)).
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9033(a), which requires "[i]n non-core proceedings, '[t]he clerk shall
serve forthwith copies [of bankruptcy judge's findings of fact] on all
parties by mail and note the date of mailing on the docket." 87
d) Administrative Agencies
"An administrative law judges' recommended decision
automatically 'becomes the decision of the agency' unless a party
objects, without any review whatsoever by the ultimate agency
decision maker." 88 The Administrative Procedure Act, section 557,
"which applies to the less formal processes of agencies, not to courts
such as the Tax Court," 89 states that "the reports of hearing officers
automatically become part of the administrative record." 90 However,
these are subject to review by superiors in some cases.9 1
e) Law Clerks
When the special tax court judge and the regular tax court judge
sit down with one another and work together to change the original
report into a collaborative document, there is a similarity to a law
clerk. Just as a law clerk might discuss the problem with other law
clerks and the judge prior to and during publication of the memo or
brief prepared by the clerk, those documents are kept confidential. If
the special tax court report is not the final report, but rather a tool to
help the regular tax judge make their final determination, it could be
considered a private step in deliberation. However, one of the major
differences is that a law clerk's bench memo will never be published,
87. See also Brief of Arnici Curiae Senator David Pryor, supra note 77, at 5
n.2 (quoting FED. R. BKRTCY. P. 9033(a)).
88. Brief of Respondent, supra note 60, at 34; 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976).
89. Brief of Joshua S. Kanter, as Executor of the Estate of Burton W. Kanter,
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2003 WL 22429190 (Oct. 6, 2003) at
11.
90. Brief of Amici Curiae Senator David Pryor, supra note 77, at 5 n.2 (citing
§557(c)).
91. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 15.
nor will their determinations be communicated to the parties.92 One
of the parties even describes a law clerk on the same level as a
secretary.93  Additionally, the law clerk does not have the same
responsibility as a special trial judge. There are no guaranteed term
limits for law clerks, the salary is much lower, and they do not have
the authority to file a dissenting opinion. A law clerk's work is
"inherently internal in nature," whereas a special trial court judge's
work is referenced and given deference in the final, external Tax
Court procedure and appeal.94
f) Boards of Contract Appeals
Established by numerous agencies, contract boards have a
presiding judge who makes an initial report and gives that report to
another judge for a final decision.95 These boards of contracts are
established to resolve any dispute between agencies and contractors.
Typically, there is a chairperson and several administrative judges.
The chairperson puts a "presiding judge" in charge of hearing the
evidence and making a report.
g) Stenographers
While attempting to demonstrate how different the special trial
judge's report is from other higher-level judges, such as a magistrate,
some briefs compare the special trial judge to a stenographer. 96 A
stenographer "takes notes" and then reports theme to whoever has
assigned them to the case. Similarly, a special trial judge "takes
notes on behalf of the absent actual factfinder, the Regular Tax Court
Judge." 97 Yet, again, the opposing argument is that the special trial
92. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40, 2004 WL
2605088, 7 (2004) (pointing out that the special trial judge report is an "officially
submitted report with a legally operative set of findings").
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id.
95. Brief of Respondent, supra note 60, at 31-32; Contract Disputes Act, 41
U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
96. Reply Brief on the Merits, WL 2652263 at 11.
97. Id.
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judges "perform more than ministerial tasks . . . and must exercise
significant discretion." 98
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Burton W. Kanter, an estate-tax lawyer and former professor,
Claude Ballard, a former senior vice-president of Prudential
Insurance Co. and Robert Leslie, a former vice president at
Prudential, all received notices of deficiency from the IRS. 99 While
working at Prudential, Ballard and Leslie played essential roles in the
purchase and development of real estate and construction projects.
Since 1968, the IRS claims that Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle agreed that
Kanter would "sell Ballard and Lisle's influence over Prudential
business and launder the proceeds through a complex network of
corporations and trusts controlled by them."' 00 The IRS claims that
all three of the parties received millions of dollars in unreported
kickbacks, amounts that were taxable. The amount at issue,
including interest and fees, is over thirty million dollars.' 0'
All three parties filed a complaint to challenge the deficiency
notices in the Tax Court where they could avoid paying until the
ruling either found them responsible or dismissed the notices. The
cases were consolidated and the Chief Judge Cohen assigned it to
Special Trial Judge D. Irvin Couvillion pursuant to Section
7443A(b)(4). 10 2 The case presented to Couvillion lasted five weeks.
The transcript was nearly 5,500 pages and the additional paperwork
was more than 4,600 pages.0 3 Couvillion prepared the special trial
judge report which was over 600 pages and gave it to Chief Judge
Cohen. Judge Cohen referred the case to Tax Court Judge Howard
A. Dawson so that Dawson could render a final decision. According
to Tax Court Rule 183, Judge Dawson was required to give deference
to the report because Couvillion was present for the five week trial,
, 98. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82.
99. Brief for Petitioners, 2004 WL 1759877 at 11.
100. Brief of Respondent, supra note 60, at 31-32 (citing 03-184 Pet. App.
48a).
101. Possley, Judges set aside Tax Court ruling, supra note 1.
102. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 49-50.
103. Brief for Petitioners, 2004 WL 1759877 at 11.
while all Judge Dawson had for review was the paperwork and
Couvillion's report.
After Judge Dawson had the report for fifteen months, he issqed
the decision on the same day that the Chief Judge officially assigned
the case to Dawson. As required by Rule 183(X), the decision stated
that the Tax Court "agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Special
Trial Judge," which is set forth in the margin of its opinion.'0 4
Dawson's decision held Kanter, Ballard and Lisle liable for the taxes
that were withheld and also assessed a fraud tax penalty. 105 This
"adopted report" states that all three parties:
[E]ntered into arrangements pursuant to which
[Kanter] would use his business and professional
contacts, including his relationships with Ballard, and
Lisle, to assist individuals and/or entities in obtaining
business opportunities or in raising capital for
business ventures with Prudential in return for
kickbacks, which Kanter would launder through a
complex organization of corporations, partnerships,
and trusts, but nor report as income for tax
purposes. 106
However, when the attorneys read the report, they did not believe
that the report provided was actually the one that Special Trial Judge
Couvillion wrote. Rather, they felt that Judge Dawson had modified
and altered it without reason.10 7 Kanter, Ballard and Lisle had heard
from two or three other judges in the Tax Court that the original
report that Couvillion submitted actually stated that the three parties
104. Id. at 9, citing TAx CT. R. 183(d).
105. 03-184 Pet. App. 19a-306a. Tax fraud penalties are very expensive:
"[t]he penalty for tax fraud is a fine of 75% plus interest for any tax deficiency
attributable to fraud, plus payment of the underlying tax deficiency." Reply Brief
on the Merits, WL 265 WL 2652263 at 13, n.20 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6663).
106. 03-184 Pet. App. at 48a; see also Brief of Petitioners, supra note 8, at 6.
107. Keep in mind that, under Rule 183, Judge Dawson was required to give
due deference to the Couvillion's report.
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should not be charged the fee for tax fraud. 10 8 To find out if the
report was actually modified, on April 20, 2000, Kanter, Ballard and
Lisle filed motions seeking to have access to "all reports, draft
opinions or similar documents prepared and delivered to the Court
pursuant to Rule 183(b)" by the Special Trial Judge. If they could
not have access to the material, they requested that the material be
put on the record so they could obtain proper review. 10 9
The Tax Court denied the motion, stating that the special trial
judge's opinion "ultimately became the Memorandum Findings of
Fact and Opinion filed on December 15, 1999" by Judge Dawson.
Further, the court found that the parties would be able to access any
other materials related to the case except for the adopted
Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion because they are
confidential and "relate to the internal deliberative processes of the
Court." 110
In response to this denial, the three parties filed a motion for
reconsideration.11 1  With this motion, they included an affidavit
stating that Kanter's counsel had heard that the original special trial
judge's report had been modified. The Tax Court opinion in
response to this motion to reconsider stated that "the only official
Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion by the Court in these
cases is T.C. Memo. 1999-407, filed on December 15, 1999 by
Special Trial Judge Couvillion, reviewed and adopted by Judge
Dawson, and reviewed and approved by former Chief Judge
Cohen." 1 2 This opinion was signed by Judge Dawson, Special Trial
Judge Couvillion and the new Chief Judge Wells. 1 3
Disappointed with this result, all three parties pursued possible
remedies in the appropriate district courts. Ballard filed a writ of
mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Kanter in the
Seventh and Lisle in the Fifth; each requested an order that the Tax
Court provide them with a copy of the original special trial judge
108. Randall G. Dick, counsel for Kanter stated in an affidavit that two or three
of the Tax Court Judges told him that the original report found the parties were not
liable for the fraud penalty. 03-134 Pet. App. 101a-102a.
109. Brief for Petitioners, 2004 WL 1759877 at 12.
110. 03-1034 Pet. App. 109a; Petitioners Brief, 2004 WL 2336550 at 7.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 50.
report."' 4 All three courts denied the petitions for writ of mandamus.
While all three of the courts held that taxpayers are not entitled to the
original report, the results varied slightly.1 5 The Eleventh Circuit, in
response to Ballard's appeal, affirmed the Tax Court decision
entirely. The court additionally stated that withholding the report
was not unconstitutional because Ballard's argument was wrongly
"premised on the assertion that the underlying report adopted by the
Tax Court is not, in fact, Couvillion's report." Ballard was required
to presume that the report provided was actually an accurate
reproduction of Special Trial Judge Couvillion's report. Even if the
report was different, the Eleventh Circuit stated that there was no
violation of due process due to the non-disclosure because "there is
nothing unusual about judges conferring with one another about
cases assigned to them."" 6 Further, the court stated that the record
showed there was enough evidence to uphold the tax fraud charge.l17
Similarly, in response to Kanter's appeal, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the entire decision. It stated that "the underlying report
adopted by the Tax Court was in fact Special Trial Judge
Couvillion's."' 18 If there were any changes to that original report,
the special trial judge would have abandoned them, and therefore it
due process was not violated. The collaborative process, of
Couvillion working with Dawson to change the original report, was
not a violation of due process because it was simply part of the
deliberative process. Again, the judge found enough evidence to
uphold the tax fraud penalty payment.19
114. In re Ballard, No. 00-14762-H (11 th Cir. Oct. 23, 2000); In re Investment
Research Ass'ns, No. 00-3369 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2000); In re Estate of Lisle, No.
00-60637 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2000); Petitioners Brief, 2004 WL 2336550 at 8.
115. 03-184 Pet. App. la-18a; 03-1034 Pet. App. la-97a; Estate of Lisle, 341
F. 3d at 364; Petitioners Brief, 2004 WL 2336550 at 8.
116. 03-184 Pet. App. 9a. Petitioners Brief, at 8.
117. 03-1034 at 14a. Petitioners Brief, 2004 WL 2336550 at 9.
118. 03-1034 at 7a. Petitioners Brief, 2004 WL 2336550 at 9.
119. In the Seventh Circuit's opinion, Judge Cudahy concurred in part and
dissented in part. He stated that the record supports "the notion that the Tax Court
engages in a quasi-collaborative process of review of the STJ's report from which a
new and frequently different STJ's opinion emerges to be adopted and agreed with
by the Tax Court." He states that this collaborated process does not violate Tax
Court Rule 183, but it does violate due process because it does not permit the
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In response to Lisle's appeal, the Fifth Circuit also stated that it
was not a violation to withhold the original special trial judge
report. 120 However, the Fifth Circuit ultimately found that the
Commissioner had not met his burden of establishing fraud, so Lisle
was not responsible for paying the fraud penalty.
Kanter and Ballard121 appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari on April 26, 2004 "to resolve the question whether
the Tax Court may exclude from the record on appeal Rule 183(b)
reports submitted by special trial judges. 122 Four questions were
brought up by petitioners in their briefs. The first three questions
address due process violations and the fourth asked "whether rule
183 requires the Tax Court to uphold findings of fact made by a
special trial judge unless they are 'clearly erroneous.' 123
III. ANALYSIS OF COURT'S OPINIONS
A. Justice Ginsburg's Majority Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by five other justices, wrote the majority
opinion holding that, under the current Tax Court Rules, the original
special trial judge's report must be disclosed. 124 In short, Ginsburg
believes that an explanation that a court cannot determine if the final
decision "reflects 'due regard' for the special trial judge's
parties to have a "meaningful appellate review." No. 03-1034 at 70a-97a.
Petitioners Brief, 2004 WL 2336550 at 9-10.
120. Estate of Lisle, 341 F.3d at 384.
121. Because Lisle's fraud assessment had been dropped at the appellate level,
Lisle did not petition for review by the Supreme Court.
122. Ballard v. Comm'r, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004).
123. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 68 n.1 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Kanter Pet. For Cert. (i)). "This court does not consider claims that are not
included within a petitioner's questions presented." There are four questions
presented, three of which do not even mention Rule 183. The only one that
mentions Rule 183 is asking, as Justice Ginsburg points out, "whether Rule 183
requires the Tax Court to uphold findings of fact made by a special trial judge
unless they are 'clearly erroneous."' Id. (citing Kanter Pet. For Cert. (i)). Chief
Justice Rehnquist also cites Lopez, 531 U.S. at 244 n.6 (holding that the only way
that the Supreme Court could tell the Tax Court that they are not following their
own rules is by failing to abide by the Supreme Court rules).
124. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 45-65 (majority opinion).
'opportunity to evaluate the credibility of [the] witnesses' and
presumes the correctness of that judge's initial fact findings."' 2 5 The
majority bases its determination that the report cannot be disclosed
on the following: (1) no statute permits withholding it, (2) federal
practice requires disclosure, and (3) there is a need for full and fair
statement of the original report.
The opinion begins by stating that the case involves the
"employment of special trial judges."' 26 She goes on to explain the
role that the special trial judges play within the tax court. They are
"auxiliary officers appointed by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to
assist in the work of the court." 127 She clearly distinguishes them
from regular Tax Court judges because the special trial judges do not
have fixed terms. 128 Next, she explains how Rule 183 governs the
process between the regular and special trial court judges, which is
referred to as a "two-tiered" proceeding. 129 The rule requires that the
special trial judge hold a trial and "submit a report, including findings
of fact and opinion, to the Chief Judge, and the Chief Judge will
assign the case to a Judge ...of the Court."'130 When the case is
assigned to the regular tax court judge, he must give "[d]ue regard..
125. Id. at 45. Ginsburg is stating that the petitioners "urge that, under the Tax
Court's current practice, the parties and the Court of Appeals lack essential
information: One cannot tell whether, as Rule 183(c) requires, the final decision
reflects "[d]ue regard" for the special trial judge's "opportunity to evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses," and presumes the correctness of that judge's initial
fact findings. Id. at 45 (quoting Rule 183(c)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(a)). In its entirety, 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(a)
states: "Appointment. The chief judge may, from time to time, appoint special trial
judges who shall proceed under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated
by the Tax Court."
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting TAX CT. R. 183(b), 26 U.S.C. § 183(b)). In its entirety, Rule
183(b) states:
Special Trial Judge's Recommendations. After all the briefs have
been filed by all the parties or the time for doing so has expired,
the Special Trial Judge shall file recommended findings of fact
and conclusions of law and a copy of the recommended findings
of fact and conclusions of law shall be served in accordance with
Rule 21.
TAX CT. R. 183(b), 26 U.S.C. § 183(b).
130. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 45 (quoting TAX CT. R. 183(b).
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. to the circumstance that the [s]pecial [t]rial [j]udge had the
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses" and the
report "shall be presumed correct."'' It is the responsibility of the
regular Tax Court judge to either "adopt the [s]pecial [t]rial [j]udge's
report or... modify it or... reject it in whole or in part."'132 Prior to
1983, the initial special trial judge reports were public, but a change
in Rule 183 changed this practice.' 33 The new version of Rule 183,
which was adopted in 1983 and went into affect in 1984, took out the
requirement that the special trial judge report had to be served on the
parties and that the parties can file exceptions to the special trial
judge's original report.134
With the explanation of these basic rules of the Tax Court, it
appears that Justice Ginsburg has found common ground among all
of the parties, as well as each of the Justices. 35 It appears clear to all
131. Id. (quoting TAX CT. R. 183(b)). In its entirety, Rule 183(c) states:
Objections. Within 45 days after the service of the recommended
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a party may serve and
file specific, written objections to the recommended findings of
fact and conclusions of law. A party may respond to another
party's objections within 30 days after being served with a copy
thereof. The above time periods may be extended by the Special
Trial Judge. After the time for objections and responses has
passed, the Chief Judge shall assign the case to a Judge for
preparation of a report in accordance with Code section 7460.
Unless a party shall have proposed a particular finding of fact, or
unless the party shall have objected to another party's proposed
finding of fact, the Judge may refuse to consider the party's
objection to the Special Trial Judge's recommended findings of
fact and conclusions of law for failure to make such a finding or
for inclusion of such finding proposed by the other party, as the
case may be.
TAX CT. R. 183(b)
132. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 45 (quoting TAX CT. R. 183(b))
133. Id.
134. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 45-46. The new version of Rule 183 went into effect
on January 16, 1984.
135. See the concurring opinion written by Justice Kennedy, which cites the
same rules and acknowledges that the reports have not been disclosed since Rule
183 was modified. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also
the dissenting opinion written by the former Chief Justice Rehnquist, which cites
the exact same rules and acknowledges that the reports have not been disclosed
that the rule requires the special trial judge to first hear the case, write
a report, and then give that report to the regular tax judge who must
either adopt, modify, or reject it. But, the specific actions the special
trial judge and regular judge should take are in dispute, as discussed
below.
The final aspect of Ginsburg's summary of the case explains that,
since 1984, none of the Tax Courts have published the special trial
judge's initial reports.' 36 Further, she points out that the Tax Court
judges do not even explain whether they modify or reject the report
as required by Rule 183. Instead, Ginsburg makes a strong statement
that the Tax Court judges fail to even write whether they are
modifying or rejecting, but rather use a "stock statement that the Tax
Court judge 'agrees with and adopts the opinion of the [s]pecial
[t]rial [j]udge."" 37 Support for this statement comes from Investment
Research Assoc. Ltd. v. Comm'r, which is only one of the many
lower level Ballard decisions, all of which came to slightly different
conclusions. The reason that this statement is so strong is self
evident; the next sentence in Ginsburg's opinion states that
"[w]hether and how the opinion thus adopted deviates from the
special trial judge's original report is never made public."' 38 If the
original report is clearly never made public, Justice Ginsburg
strongly believes from the evidence presented that there are changes
to the opinions, even though the Tax Court judge states that he or she
is adopting the special trial court opinion and is not modifying it.
In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg addresses the dissent's accusation
that the certiorari question was not answered by the majority. 139 The
since Rule 183 was modified. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 68-73 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
136. Id. at 45-46 (majority opinion) (quoting TAx CT. R. 183(b), n.81).
Justice Ginsburg states that "[w]hether and how the opinion thus adopted deviates
from the special trial judge's original report is never made public." Id. at 46.
137. Id. (citing Inv. Research Assoc. Ltd. v. Comm'r, 78 TMC 951, 963
(1999), P99, 477 RIA Memo TC, p. 2562-2563).
138. Id. (quoting Inv. Research Assoc. Ltd., 78 TMC at 963).
139. Id. at n.2 (quoting the dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. at n. 1 which
states that: "This court does not consider claims that are not included within a
petitioner's questions presented." Id. at 68 n.1 (Rehnquist, dissenting). There are
four questions presented, three of which do not even mention Rule 183. Chief
Justice Rehnquist also cites Lopez v. Davis, which states that the only way that the
Supreme Court could tell the Tax Court that they are not following their own rules
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only question posed by petitioners that mentions Rule 183 is
"whether Tax Court Rule 183 requires Tax Court judges to uphold
findings made by special trial judges unless 'clearly erroneous." ' 140
Justice Ginsburg quickly dismisses this issue by clarifying that the
true meaning of Rule 183 is "anterior to all other questions the parties
raised."'14 1 Further, Rule 14.1(a) of the Supreme Court Rules states
that "[t]he statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise
every subsidiary question fairly included therein."' 142
Next, Justice Ginsburg gives a brief recitation of the facts leading
up to the use of the special trial judge; at this point, she provides a
detailed explanation of the Tax Court. 43  In this section of the
opinion, she focuses on the differences between special trial judges
and regular judges: the unlimited term,'" the lower salary,"'5 the
limited cases that special trial judges can handle,"46 and how final
authority in cases like the one at hand are reserved 147 for the regular
is by failing to abide by the Supreme Court rules. Id. (citing Lopez v. Davis, 531
U.S. 230, 244 n.6 (2001)).
140. Id. at 47 n.2 (majority opinion).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting SuP. CT. R. 14.1(a); citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 337,
381 n.3 (1992); citing R. STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 414 (8th ed.
2002) ("[q]uestions not explicitly mentioned but essential to analysis of the
decisions below or to the correct disposition of other issues have been treated as
subsidiary issues fairly comprised by the question presented")).
143. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 48-50. The facts of the case, although detailed (the
original trial took five weeks) are consolidated into only five sentences and one
footnote. Id. It is unnecessary to examine all of the detail of the case because the
procedural aspect of the courts ruling is in question here; the content of the case
will be determined upon remand if necessary.
144. Id. at 48-49. The nineteen regular judges are appointed by the President
for a renewable term of fifteen-years. Special trial judges are appointed by the
Chief Judge and there is no designated time.
145. Id. Special trial judges receive 90% of the salary of regular trial judges.
146. Id. The special trial judges have authority to make a final judgment in
"small tax cases" as well as levy and lien proceedings. TAx CT. R. 182, 26 U.S.C.
App, p. 1619; § 7443A(b)(1)-(4).
147. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 49 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-882 (holding that
special trial judges "take testimony, conduct trials, [and] rule on the admissibility
of evidence," in cases over $50,000 but "lack authority to enter a final decision")).
Id.
tax judge.'4 8 Throughout the description of the facts, it seems clear
that Justice Ginsburg doubts that the regular trial judge adopted the
findings of the special trial judge as claimed. When discussing Judge
Dawson's result, Justice Ginsburg states that the judge "purported to
adopt the findings contained in the report submitted by Judge
Couvillion."' 49  There is also quite a bit of detail regarding the
affidavit, which stated that the special trial court report was not
actually written by Judge Couvillion. Justice Ginsburg also
extensively quotes the Tax Court's ultimate conclusions that "'Judge
Dawson adopted the findings of fact and opinion of Special Trial
Judge Couvillion, . . . Judge Dawson presumed the findings of fact
recommended by Special Trial Judge Couvillion were correct, and..
• Judge Dawson gave due regard' to Judge Couvillion's credibility
findings."' 50
Justice Ginsburg's analysis begins with an analysis of Rule 183,
quoting the entire section below:
Action on the Report: The Judge to whom . . . the case is
assigned may adopt the Special Trial Judge's report or may modify it
or may reject it in whole or in part, or may direct the filing of
additional briefs or may receive further evidence or may direct oral
argument, or may recommit the report with instructions. Due regard
shall be given to the circumstance that the Special Trial Judge had the
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and the findings
of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to
be correct."'
Although it was possible for Judge Dawson to go beyond the
report provided him, Judge Dawson did nothing more than take the
special trial judge's report into consideration along with the trial
transcript and other documents on file. 5 2 There is no evidence to
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis added). At this point in the trial, the original special trial
judge's report had not been disclosed; however, it appears that the majority is
assuming that the regular trial judge's report did not adopt the special trial judge's
report as it said it did.
150. Id. at 51 (quoting order of Aug. 30, 2000, No. 43966-85, TC App. to
Kanter, Pet. for Cert.).
151. Id. at 50 (citing Rule 183(c)).
152. Id. at 54. It appears from the writing, that Justice Ginsburg would have
thought more highly of the diligence of Judge Dawson had he actually asked for
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suggest that Judge Dawson asked the parties to file additional briefs,
nor is there evidence that Judge Dawson asked the special trial judge
to recommit the original report for any reason.1 53
Justice Ginsburg finds a clear understanding of the "deference
due" language from Rule 183(c) from the rule's history. Rule
182(d), the predecessor to Rule 183(c), was modeled after the former
Court of Claims' Rule 147(b), 154 which included a requirement of
"due regard" and a presumption of correctness. 55  In Hebah v.
United States, the Court of Claims ruled that this meant it is
necessary to "make 'a strong affirmative showing' to overcome the
presumption of correctness that attaches to trial judge findings." 56
Justice Ginsburg states that it is clear that a special trial court judge's
opinion must carry "special weight insofar as those findings are
additional information before making his final decision. This speculation again
shows that Justice Ginsburg believes, at this point, that the original trial judge
report has been changed. Respondents argue that judges are presumed to be correct
and therefore the entire basis of the argument and Justice Ginsburg's contentions
are misplaced. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 8.
153. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 54. While the record shows that the Chief Judge
"reassigned" the case to Judge Dawson, this is not like recommitting. Id. at n.10.
The "reassignment" that took place was actually not even a reassignment; rather,
Judge Dawson knew the case was his and likely was working on it during the
fifteen months after it was originally signed. Id. Judge Dawson's opinion was
published the same day that the Chief Judge reassigned the case to Judge Dawson
which logically means that the reassigmnent was simply a technical, paperwork
reassignment because it would have been impossible for Judge Dawson to write the
opinion in one day.
154. The original version of Rule 147(b) being referenced here states:
The court may adopt the [trial judge's] report, including
conclusions of fact and law, or may modify it, or reject it in
whole or in part, or direct the [trial judge] to receive further
evidence, or refer the case back to him with instructions. Due
regard shall be given to the circumstance that the [trial judge] had
the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses; and
the findings of fact made by the [trial judge] shall be presumed to
be correct.
28 U.S.C. App, p. 7903 (1970 ed.).
155. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 54. A comment, written in 1973, to Rule 182(b)
stated that it was modeled after Rule 147(b). Stephens v. C.I.R, 60 T.C. 1150 n.
182 (1973) (stating that Tax Court review procedures are comparable to Court of
Claims review procedures).
156. Hebah v. United States, 456 F.2d 696, 698 (Fed. Cl. 1972).
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determined by the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses." 157
Next, Justice Ginsburg examines the original meaning of Rule 182
(Rule 183's predecessor). 158  When Rule 182 was in place, the
regular tax judge looked at the special trial judge report on his own;
if he disagreed with the report, he would modify the report and
publish it. 159 At this time, the special trial judge reports were being
published, made part of the appellate record and served on the
parties. 6 ° Parties could check to make sure that "due regard" was
given and there was a "presumption of correctness" because they had
access to the original report.' 6'
The majority finds it especially important that, when Rule 182
was revised (and renumbered as 183) in 1983, three essential
elements were left in: (1) the language requiring a presumption of
correction, (2) language requiring due regard, and (3) language
requiring that the regular tax court judge "adopt," "modify," or
"reject [the special trial judge's report] in whole or in part."' 162
Although the new rule does not state that the report must be served
on the parties, it is critical that these other three requirements were
left in. Since the modification of the rule, not one instance can be
found where the original report is modified or rejected. 63 It is clear
that those adopting these rules intended for the regular tax judge to
continue to modify or reject as they did before, the way the tax court
is now operating, this intended rule is being ignored. 164
157. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 54 (quoting Stephens, 60 T.C. at 1150); see Stone v.
Comm'r, 865 F.2d 342, 345 (C.A.D.C. 1989).
158. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 55-56.
159. Id. at 56. For two instances where the original reports were modified, see
Rosenbaum v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. 825, 827 (1983) and Taylor v. Comm'r, 41
T.C.M. 539 (1980).
160. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 56.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Rule 183(c), 81 T.C. at 1069 n.183). Furthermore, "the
findings of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be
correct" and "due regard" should be given to the special trial judge's credibility
findings. Id.
163. Id. (citing Kanter, 337 F.3d at 876); cf Tr. Of Oral Arg., supra note 5 at
44.
164. Ballard, 540 U.S. at 57.
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1. The Collaborative Process
Next, Justice Ginsburg discusses the "novel practice" of the Tax
Court judge treating the report as an "in-house draft to be worked
over collaboratively by the regular judge and the special trial
judge."' 165 Currently, Tax Court judges receive the special trial
judge's report pursuant to Rule183(b), and treat it "essentially as an
in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular judge
and the special trial judge."'166 There is no Tax Court rule allowing
this "joint enterprise," nor is it explained in any publication, policy
statement or interpretive guide. 167 After the collaborative process,
the regular Tax Court judge simply agrees and adopts the special trial
court decision, which was the situation in Ballard.168
Another reason that this collaborative process is unauthorized and
inappropriate is that the Tax Court Rules only refer to one opinion of
the special trial judge. 169 As the "sole opinion properly ascribed to
the special trial judge under the current Rules," a second,
collaborative opinion is not permitted. 70 Further, if the regular Tax
Court judge is adding his own opinion to the special trial judge's
report, Justice Ginsberg recognizes that "[o]ne would be hard put to
explain ... how a final decisionmaker... would give '[d]ue regard'
165. Id. Justice Ginsburg states that the Tax Court disregarded the intent of
those who drafted Rule 183 and "inaugurated a novel practice regarding the report
the special trial judge submits post-trial to the Chief Judge." Id.
166. Id. The reason that this practice is new is because, as Justice Ginsburg
pointed out, when the parties were able to see the special trial judge report copies,
the regular Tax Court judges independently evaluated the report and adopted,
modified or rejected it in part or in whole. There are at least two cases where it is
clear that the report was modified and the parties could see two separate,
independent reports. Id.
167. Id. at 57 n.12 (citing Kanter, 337 F.3d, at 876-877 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting)).
168. Id. at 57-8.
169. Id. at 58. The only time this opinion is mentioned is when the Court
states that "the Special Trial Judge shall submit a report, including findings of fact
and opinion, to the Chief Judge." Id. (quoting TAX CT. R. 183(b), 26 U.S.C. App.,
p. 1619 (emphasis added)).
170. Id.
to and 'presum[e] to be correct' an opinion the judge himself
collaborated in producing."' 71
Justice Ginsburg stops short of denigrating the collaborative
process. All she is saying is that this process is not permitted under
the current rules. 172 She does admit that the collaboration might be
efficient.173 The majority does not say that changing the original
special trial report should be entirely banned. Justice Ginsburg is
"confident" that if there is a clerical error that the regular Tax Court
judge notices, he could give it back to the special trial judge for
correction. 174 Next, the majority explains the legal reasons that "[t]he
Tax Court, like all other decisionmaking tribunals, is obliged to
follow its own Rules."' 75 In an opinion that has very little case law
outside of direct case history, the opinion provides two cases to prove
that the Tax Court cannot violate their own rules.' 76 First, Service v.
Dulles states that the Secretary of State must follow its Regulations,
and, second, Vitarelli v. Seaton states that a Secretary is bound by his
own regulations. Finally, the opinion also gives a concurring in part
and dissenting in part statement that an agency "must be rigorously
held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged." 177
171. Id. at 59. The deference rules have little meaning, according to the
majority, if the judges are working together to produce an outcome because a judge
would not find it necessary to modify or reject his own work.
172. Id. (stating that "we find no warrant for [the Tax Court's current practice]
in the Rules the Tax Court publishes").
173. Id.
174. Id. at 59 n.14. In response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, the
majority is stating that it would be appropriate for either the special trial judge to
notice an "error of substance" or the regular Tax Court judge to notice "clerical
error" and to fix it.
175. Id. at 59.
176. Id. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (Secretary of State
"could not, so long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard
to them"). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540 (1959) (Secretary bound
by regulations he promulgated "even though without such regulations" he could
have taken the challenged action. Id. at 546.
177. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 59 (citing Dulles, 354 U.S. at 388 (1957); Vitarelli,
359 U.S. at 540).
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One of the major aspects that the dissent rests its hat on is that the
Tax Court should have the ability to interpret its own rules. 178 In one
brief sentence, the majority inadequately dismisses this notion by
stating that
"[a]lthough the Tax Court is not without leeway in interpreting its
own Rules, it is unreasonable to read into Rule 183 an unprovided-for
collaborative process, and to interpret the formulations 'due regard'
and 'presumed to be correct,' to convey something other than what
those same words meant prior to the 1983 rule changes."'' 79
It must be assumed that Justice Ginsburg does not even see the
collaborative process as a possible interpretation of the Tax Court
rules because the history of the rule requires disclosure, while the
rules only mention one special trial judge report. 180
2. Appellate Review
The second reason that the majority does not permit the special
trial judge to modify the report in collaboration with the regular Tax
Court judge is because it "impedes fully informed appellate review of
the Tax Court's decision." '81 Again, the support for this is the
consensus that the Tax Court rules require the regular Tax Court
judge to give "due regard" to the special trial judge. On review, there
must be some way to ascertain whether this "due regard" was
actually given. Justice Ginsburg gives additional emphasis to the
circumstances of the case at hand; the special trial judge's factual
determinations in a fraud case are essential.18 2
178. Id. at 67-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist states
that the Tax Court should be treated as an executive agency and should have the
ability to interpret its own rules. If it interprets its rules to mean that there should
be a collaborative process, then the Supreme Court should give deference to that
interpretation.
179. Id. at 59 (majority opinion).
180. See supra notes 124-198.
181. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 59.
182. Id. at 60. Specifically, the majority states that "[t]he Tax Court's decision
repeatedly draws outcome-influencing conclusions regarding the credibility of
Ballard, Kanter, and several other witnesses." Id. The Court provides the
following examples: Investment Research Assoc., 78 T.C,M., at 1060, P99,407 RIA
Memo TC, p 2675 ("We find Kanter's testimony to be implausible."); Id., at 1083,
P99,407 RIA Memo TC, p 2703 ("[W]e find Ballard's testimony vague, evasive,
The majority quickly rejects the argument that the original report
by the special trial judge is an internal draft that should be kept
confidential. 83 Justice Ginsburg states that the fact that Rule 183
does not permit a draft is enough to dismiss this argument.'84 The
majority also states that the tax court process of concealing the
original report is "anomalous."' 85 The practice of all other tribunals
to use hearing officers, including magistrate judges, special masters,
and bankruptcy judges requires, by statute, the initial hearing part of
the record.' 86 The majority asks the question: "[I]f there are policy
reasons that dictate transparency for everyone else, why do these
reasons not apply to the Tax Court?"'87 The Commissioner argues
and unreliable."); Id. at 1079, P99,407 RIA Memo TC, p 2698 ("The testimony of
Thomas Lisle, Melinda Ballard, Hart, and Albrecht is not credible."); Id. at 1140,
P99,407 RIA Memo TC, p 2776 ("[T]he witnesses presented on behalf of
[Investment Research Associates] in this case were obviously biased, and their
testimony was not credible."). Absent access to the special trial judge's Rule
183(b) report in this and similar cases, the appellate court will be at a loss to
determine (1) whether the credibility and other findings made in that report were
accorded "[d]ue regard" and were "presumed ... correct" by the Tax Court judge,
or (2) whether they were displaced without adherence to those standards. See
Kanter, 337 F.3d at 886 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I
can think of no single item of more significance in evaluating a Tax Court's
decision on fraud than the unfiltered findings of the [special trial judge] who stood
watch over the trial.").
183. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 60-61 (citing Brief for Respondent 16-17 (quoting
from United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)). The Respondent is
arguing that seeing the draft would be a "probe into the mental processes" of the
special trial judge and the regular Tax Court judge. Id.
184. Id. at 61. See supra note 124-198.
185. Id. at 62.
186. Id. at 64. "The initial findings or recommendations of magistrate judges,
special masters, and bankruptcy judges are available to the appellate court
authorized to review the operative decision of the district court." Id. at 62. See also
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (magistrate judge's proposed findings must be filed with
the court and mailed to the parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(f) (special masters); FED. R.
BKRTCY. P. 9033(a), (d) (bankruptcy judges); FED. R. App. P. 10(a) (record on
appeal includes the original papers filed in the district court). The Administrative
Procedure Act provides: "All decisions, including initial, recommended, and
tentative decisions, are a part of the record" on appeal." 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976).
See also § 706 (the reviewing court shall evaluate the "whole record").
187. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 62 (quoting Kanter, 337 F.3d at 874 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). While the Court does point out specific
instances where the transparency is required, the actual policy reasons behind the
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that the Tax Court does permit the transparency, therefore, it is not
"anomalous" because 26 U.S.C. § 7460(b) allows a regular Tax
Court judge's opinion to be kept secret when a full Tax Court
reviews that single judge's opinion.' 88 While this argument appears
credible, the majority rejects it because the special trial judge report
is "markedly" different from the single Tax Court judge report. 189
This is a statutory rule that has been accepted from the creation of the
Tax Court; 19° the purpose of the full court review is to resolve legal
issues de novo, not factual ones that are essential to the judgment and
are to be "presumed correct."'191 Another reason that the full panel is
different is that the judges on the panel are equal in rank to the single
Tax Court judge that wrote the first opinion, while the special trial
judge is inferior. 192 As a judge with equal ranking, each judge on the
full panel has the authority to file a dissenting opinion if he disagrees;
a special trial judge has no recourse to express his dissatisfaction
with a result. 193 The Court also rejects the Commissioner's argument
transparency are not laid out. The Court also quotes another opinion that cannot
find a reason to permit the secrecy (Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 519).
188. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 62-63 (citing 26 U.S.C.S. § 7460(b) (1954)). This
statute in full reads as follows:
Effect of action by a division. The report of the division shall
become the report of the Tax Court within 30 days after such
report by the division, unless within such period the chief judge
has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.
Any preliminary action by a division which does not form the
basis for the entry of the final decision shall not be subject to
review by the Tax Court except in accordance with such rules as
the Tax Court may prescribe. The report of a division shall not
be a part of the record in any case in which the chiefjudge directs
that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.
§7460(b).
189. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 63.
190. Id. (citing to the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 871. This
Act was part of the founding rules of the Tax Court). In a full panel judge review,
the judges are looking at the legal issues de novo, whereas when a regular Tax
Court judge reviews the special trial judge report, they are actually using the factual
findings of the special trial judge to determine if it is correct.
191. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 63; see also L. LEDERMAN & S. MAZZA, TAX
CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 247 (2000).
192. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 64; see also id. at 64 n.16.
193. Id. at 64; see also Kanter, 337 F.3d, at 879-880 (Cudahy, J., concurring in
party and dissenting in part).
that the transparency exists in contract dispute resolution panels
because the presiding judges are "equal in stature to that of the other
panel members" and can therefore file a dissent. 1
94
Finally, in its conclusion, the Court cautions that it is not settling
some of the issues raised in the case; there was enough evidence to
reverse and remand the case on the finding that Rule 183 does not
permit the special trial judge report to be confidential. 195 First, the
taxpayers request that the Court answer whether the appellate review
statute requires the Tax Court to operate in the same way that all
other courts do, which would mean making the initial special trial
judge fact findings part of the record.' 96 Second, the taxpayers
request that the court address whether the non-disclosure violates due
process. 197 The majority express "no opinion" on either of these
issues, but the Court does state that the Tax Court might change its
rules in the future to permit the collaborative process or keep the
report confidential. 98
194. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 64 n.16. This argument is not given much weight by
the majority which is evidenced by the fact that it is dismissed in a footnote. In
their reply brief, the Petitioners spent a great deal of time detailing the similarities.
195. Id. at 64. Specifically, the court is not answering (1) whether the
appellate review statute requires disclosure of the special trial judge report and (2)
whether keeping the special trial judge report secret is a violation of due process.
196. Id. The appellate review statute upon which the taxpayers base their
argument states:
Jurisdiction.
(1) In general. The United States Courts of Appeals (other than
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax
Court, except as provided in section 1254 of Title 28 of the
United States Code, in the same manner and to the same extent as
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a
jury; and the judgment of any such court shall be final, except
that it shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon certiorari, in the manner provided in section
1254 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
Id, citing 26 U.S.C §7481(a)(1)(1997).
197. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65. Among the eighteen briefs filed in this case over
forty pages discuss the due process issue while clearly the majority "express[es] no
opinion" on this issue. Id.
198. Id.
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B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote the concurring
opinion.199 This concurring opinion is less than two pages long and
goes a step further than the majority for the purpose of helping the
judges upon remand.2 °° In the opinion, Justice Kennedy reiterates
that deference must be given to the special trial judge's findings, and
that the only way that litigants and appellate courts can evaluate
whether this deference was given is to publish the special trial
judge's report. 20 ' The "most natural reading of the text of Rule 183"
requires that there is only one special trial judge, not two different
reports. 2 02 Further, through the recommit process, the regular tax
court judge can send the report back to the special trial judge with
instructions to alter the opinion. 20 3  If the authors of the rules
intended for each work to be collaborative, Justice Kennedy argues
that they would not have included a method to send the report back to
the special trial judge for reconsideration.20 4
Like the majority, the concurrence recommends that the Tax
Court "might design a rule" if it "deems it necessary to allow
informal consultation and collaboration between the special trial
199. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Id. Justice Kennedy agrees with the majority; he states "[tihe Court is
correct, in my view, in holding, first, that Tax Court Rule 183(c) mandates 'that
deference is due to factfindings made by the [special] trial judge' and that 'it is the
Rule 183(b) report . . . that Rule 183(c) ... instructs the Tax Court to review."' Id.
at 65.
201. Id. at 66.
202. Id. Here, Justice Kennedy is specifically referring to the word "report" in
rule 183(b).
203. Id. Under Rule 183(c), stating that "the Tax court judge can 'recommit
the report with instructions' to the special trial judge." Id. "Recommittal is
generally a formal mechanism for initiating reconsideration or other formal action
by the initial decision maker." Id. (citing, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 71(b), which states
"The district judge may accept, reject or modify the recommended decision,
receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions."). Note that Justice Kennedy is using a magistrate as an analogy to
prove his point, in that an avenue for recommittal means that the there is no room
for a collaborative work. Compare this with Justice Ginsburg's opinion, which
clearly distinguished a magistrate from the Tax Court's special trial judge methods
in the majority opinion. See supra notes 124-198.
204. Id. at 66-67.
judge and the Tax Court judge." 20 5 However, it warns the lower
court that, on remand, it cannot simply require the regular Tax Court
judge to provide a detailed explanation for why they rejected or
modified the report.20 6 Justice Kennedy writes that this reason will
not work because he believes it is evident that the Tax Court Rules
would not require that deference be given to the special trial judge
report without providing a way to "ensure its enforcement., 20 7
The most unique aspect of the concurring opinion is that Justice
Kennedy recognizes that the special trial judge's report has not been
seen, so any discussions regarding the "collaborative process" by the
majority or assumptions that the regular Tax Court judge instructed
the special trial judge to change the report, which the dissent
discusses, are only speculation.20 8
If the court finds that the report was changed inappropriately, it
must fimd a violation of Rule 183 and remedy this situation by taking
the special trial judge's original report, giving it deference and
making a final ruling.20 9 However, if the report was not changed,
there is no violation and the fraud assessments should stand.210
In all future cases, Tax Court judges must read Rule 183 as
requiring that deference be given; as such, there must be a method to
check that deference is being given. It appears that Justice Kennedy
is stating that disclosure is not mandatory if the Tax Court can find
another way to make certain deference is actually being given to the
original report.21 '
205. Id. See also Ballard, 544 U.S. at 63-64 (majority opinion).
206. Id. at 67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 68.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because this is speculation on both
the part of the majority and the dissent, all of this entire case could determine that
Rule 183 requires that the report not be changed and that it must be disclosed. If it
turns out to be the exact same report as the regular Tax Court judge purports that it
is, there is no flaw in the procedural steps taken and the judgment must stand.
211. Id. This could also be interpreted as stating that the only way that Justice
Kennedy and Justice Scalia see that deference can be checked is through
disclosure. But, it does appear to show that disclosure is only one method:
"[i]ncluding the original findings of fact in the record on appeal would make that
possible." Id.
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C. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissenting Opinion
The former Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas
joins, authors a strong opposition to the court's determination that
Rule 183 requires disclosure.212 First, the dissent does not believe
that the majority even answered the questions that were certified for
review.213 Second, Justice Rehnquist states that the Supreme Court
should give deference to the Tax Court because the Tax Court has the
right to interpret its own rules. 214 As discussed above, the majority
briefly, and inadequately, addresses these two arguments.
215
Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that the Tax Court's
interpretation of Rule 183 is reasonable and should therefore be
accepted.216 First, it is reasonable because, if there are changes to the
original report, those changes would "presumptively be the result of
the [special trial judge's] legitimate reevaluation of the case. 217
212. Id. at 68 n. 1 ((Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Kanter Pet. For Cert.
(i)). "This Court does not consider claims that are not included within a
petitioner's questions presented." Id. There are four questions presented, three of
which do not even mention Rule 183. The only one that mentions Rule 183 is
asking, as Justice Ginsburg points out, "whether Rule 183 requires the Tax Court to
uphold findings of fact made by a special trial judge unless they are 'clearly
erroneous."' Chief Justice Rehnquist also cites Lopez v. Davis, which states that
the only way that the Supreme Court could tell the Tax Court that they are not
following their own rules is by failing to abide by the Supreme Court rules. Id.
(citing Lopez, 531 U.S. at 244 n.6).
213. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 68-73.
214. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist states that the Tax Court should be treated as
an executive agency and should have the ability to interpret its own rules. If it
interprets its rules to mean that there should be a collaborative process, then the
Supreme Court should give deference to that interpretation.
215. See supra notes 124-198.
216. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 69-70 (quoting Brief for Respondent 11). But see
Justice Ginsburg's statement in the majority opinion:
Although the Tax Court is not without leeway in interpreting its
Rules, it is unreasonable to read into Rule 183 an unprovided-for
collaborative process, and to interpret the formulations "due
regard" and "presumed to be correct," to convey something other
than what those same words meant prior to the 1983 rule
changes.
Id. at 59 (majority opinion).
217. Id. at 70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). But see the majority opinion
which focuses on the fact that the special trial judges are working as subservient
Second, it is reasonable because Rule 183 was changed by the Tax
Court to eliminate the requirement that the report must be sent to the
parties, and that the parties can make exceptions to it.218
If there are two reasonable interpretations of Rule 183, when
deference to the Tax Court is being utilized, the Tax Court's
interpretation should be accepted.219 In this case, seven Justices
believe that it is reasonable to interpret Rule 183 to mean that the
special trial judge's report must be checked 220 and two Justices
believe that it is reasonable to interpret Rule 183 to mean that the
special trial judge's report should be kept secret.221 The majority
agrees that "the Tax Court is not without leeway in interpreting its
Rules." 222 As Justice Rehnquist argues, "[a]n agency's interpretation
of its own rule or regulation is entitled to 'controlling weight unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'
223
IV. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY AND IMPACT
A. Impact on the U.S. Tax Court
The subsequent action taken since the Supreme Court decided
Ballard makes it clear that this case has altered and will continue to
officers to the regular Tax Court judges without a protected term limit and
therefore are not able to simply make a "legitimate reevaluation." Id. at 70 (citing
Brief for Respondent 11).
218. Id. While the majority and the concurring opinions both acknowledge
that the rule was changed, they focus on the fact that the portion requiring
deference was left in and therefore, the drafters did not actually want to change any
of the requirements of publishing the report. But, neither the majority nor the
concurring opinion directly addresses the point that it was taken out and that this
affirmative action of taking it out should be given some deference.
219. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 410.
220. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 65-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 66
(majority opinion).
221. Id. at 68-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist states
that the Tax Court should be treated as an executive agency and should have the
ability to interpret its own rules. If it interprets its rules to mean that there should
be a collaborative process, then the Supreme Court should give deference to that
interpretation.
222. Id. at 59 (majority opinion); see supra note 215.
223. Id. at 68-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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impact the U.S. Tax Court in many ways.2 24 First, the much
speculated and much anticipated225 unveiling of the special trial
judge's original Ballard fact-finding report took place and cases were
heard upon remand.226 Second, the Tax Court changed its rules in
reaction to the case. 227 Third, the Tax Court attempted to locate and
publish all of the special trial reports that were ultimately decided by
a regular Tax Court judge since 1983 to right their wrongs. 228
1. Revealing of the Special Trial Report and Remand
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit required that Special Trial Judge
Couvillion's report become part of the record.229  The Seventh
Circuit, which heard the case immediately after the Supreme Court
issued its decision, did not order immediate production of the special
trial judge report.230 Rather, the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to Rule 54
224. The subsequent action taken can be seen through the further judicial
determinations in the case as well as numerous periodical articles published in
reaction to the case. See, e.g., infra note 226. The impact is also evidenced by the
fact that the following organizations or parties participated in amicus briefs filed
with the Supreme Court: the Public Citizen Inc. (2004 WL 1743940, August 2,
2004), the American Civil Liberties Union (2004 WL 1743940, August 2, 2004),
the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation (2004 WL
1743944, August 2, 2004), and Professor Leandra Lederman (2004 WL 1748636,
August 2, 2004).
225. Since the first decision in this case, Inv. Research Assoc., Ltd., 78 T.C.M.
91, 1999 WL 1313635, was heard by the Tax Court in 1999, the parties involved
have been requesting access to the special trial judge report.
226. Upon remand in Ballard, Kanter's case was head by the Seventh Circuit
(Kanter v. Comm'r., 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir., 2005) (per curiam)) (sending the case
to the Tax Court on remand). Ballard's case was heard by the Eleventh Circuit
(Ballard v. Comm'r. 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir., 2005) (per curiam) (vacating
original Tax Court finding because that the special trial judge report was not given
deference, sending the case to the Tax Court for remand)).
227. TAX CT. R. 183 (amended Sept. 20, 2005). Although the rule was
recently amended, the cases upon remand still reflect Rule 183 as it was written
prior to this date. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1030 n.3.
228. Louise Story, Tax Court Lifts Secrecy, Putting Some Cases in New Light,
N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at C6.
229. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1031 (11 th Cir.) (this court looked at the special trial
judge report).
230. Kanter, 406 F.3d at 933 was heard on May 9, 2005. The dissenting
opinion strongly disagrees with the decision to wait for the order of production of
immediately remanded the case to the Tax Court with instructions to
follow the Supreme Court findings, ensuring that production of the
special trial judge report is required by the Tax Court.2 3 1
When the initial special trial report was revealed, the truth of the
matters that had been speculated unfolded as the parties had hoped,
but as Judge Dawson feared. It turns out that Ballard and Kentar
were correct; Judge Dawson did modify the report that Special Trial
Judge Couvillion submitted.232 The original report did not find any
the special trial judge report, stating that "[t]his report must be included in the
record, and I see no reason why it cannot be produced without further delay. It was
improperly withheld, and that nondisclosure ought to cease -- now." Id. at 934
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 934 (majority opinion).
232. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1029. The judges in the Eleventh Circuit gave the
true "undisclosed history" in the case as shown below (although this is lengthy, the
details sheds light on all of the matters speculated upon by the Supreme Court):
1. Judge Couvillion's original report initially recommended that
Ballard was not liable for the deficiencies in tax asserted against
him. Specifically, Judge Couvillion concluded that "there were
no 'kickback schemes,' and none of the alleged 'kickback
schemes' payments by 'The Five' represented unreported income
of Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle. There was, therefore, no
underpayment of tax." In fact, Judge Couvillion's original report
did not consider the government's allegation of fraud "as even
rising to the level of suspicion of fraud."
2. After Judge Dawson was assigned to the case, he reviewed
Judge Couvillion's original report and advised the Chief Judge
that he disagreed with it. Approximately one week later, on or
about August 27, 1998, then Chief Judge Cohen advised Judge
Dawson that she also disagreed with Judge Couvillion's original
report.
3. A conference was scheduled between Chief Judge Cohen,
Judge Dawson, and Judge Couvillion. It appears that shortly
before this conference was to take place, Judge Couvillion was
aware that both Chief Judge Cohen and Judge Dawson disagreed
with his report.
4. On September 1, 1998, Judge Couvillion withdrew his
original report.
5. Chief Judge Cohen assigned Judge Dawson and Judge
Couvillion to write a "collaborative report." This "collaborative
report" stood in stark contrast to Judge Couvillion's original
report. In fact, the collaborative report now concluded that
Ballard should be liable for the deficiencies in tax asserted
against him.
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of the taxpayers liable for paying the fraud assessment.233 The
parties also found out that the "collaborative process" that the
majority determined was in conflict with the Tax Court's own rules,
was actually used.3 Judge Dawson and Special Trial Judge
Couvillion took the initial findings of fact, met with one another over
the time that Judge Dawson had the case assigned to him and
changed the findings of fact.235
The Eleventh Circuit did not just require that the special trial
report be published; rather, "[i]n a public exhibition of strong
displeasure, the Eleventh Circuit . . . ordered three U.S. Tax Court
judges to have nothing further to do with a pending case, demanded a
new assignment of the case, and brusquely ordered the entire 19-
judge Tax Court to "adhere strictly hereafter" to its own rules. 236
As a practical matter of these two rulings and the determination
of Judge Couvillion, it is likely that Kanter and Ballard will not have
to pay the fraud assessments. But, the long term effect of the
judgment, after the harsh ruling, is that Tax Court judges will likely
give extreme deference to the finding of fact of the special trial
judges. Because the special trial court is evaluating the witnesses,
the Court made it specifically clear that credibility issues should be
given the most deference and only changed if "manifestly
unreasonable." 237 In Ballard's case, the Court required the following
actions to be taken:238
6. On October 25, 1999, Judge Dawson adopted the "new
collaborative report."
7. On November 4, 1999, Chief Judge Cohen adopted the "new
collaborative report" with some minor modifications.
8. On December 15, 1999, Chief Judge Cohen formally
assigned the case to Judge Dawson, and the "new collaborative





236. Lyle Denniston, Tax Court and Three Judges Rebuked, scotusblog.com,
at http://www.scotusblog.com/moveabletype/archives/2005/10/30-week.
237. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1031 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470
U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("Credibility determinations are entitled to great deference,
and must not be disturbed unless manifestly unreasonable.").
238. This will most likely also be the case in Kanter's case.
-Nullify the joint report of Cohen, Dawson and
Couvillion; 3
9
-Reinstate Couvillion's original report;240
- Refer the case to a regular Tax Court judge "who
had no involvement" in preparing the joint report;24 1
-Give "due regard" to Couvillion's credibility
determinations; 24
2
-Presume that his fact findings are correct "unless
manifestly unreasonable; " 243
-"Adhere strictly hereafter to the amended Tax Court
rules in finalizing Tax Court opinions; ,244 and
- Judges Cohen, Dawson, and Couvillion, "are not to
be involved in this new review."
245
2. Changes to the Tax Court Rules
In direct response to the Supreme Court decision, the Tax Court
modified their Rules "to reflect the dictates of the Supreme Court's
opinion. "246 The change was not to permit secret reports as the
Supreme Court suggested might be possible.247 The revised Rule 183
Tax Court now requires service of the special trial judge report. 248
This new rule makes it clear that the initial special trial judge reports
must be both available to the parties and be part of the appellate
record. The notes accompanying the changes to the Tax Court rules
state that the new rules require the following changes:
1. The preparation of the recommended findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the special trial judge;






245. Id. at n. 7.
246. See supra note 233.
247. See supra notes 199-211 (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurrence) and
124-198.
248. US ORDER 05-5 1; Revision to TAX CT. R. 183, Sept. 20, 2005.
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2. The filing of the recommendations;
3. Service of the recommendations on the parties;
4. A reasonable opportunity for the parties to file
objections to the recommendations before the case is
reassigned to a Presidentially appointed judge for
action on the recommendations; and
5. Action on the recommendations by the assigned
Presidentially appointed judge in accordance with
Rule 183 as amended. The standard for reviewing a
special trial judge's recommendations remains
unchanged.249
3. Revealing all Special Trial Reports Since 1983
The Tax Court went above and beyond what the Supreme Court
required of them to right their wrongs. Judge Gerber, a Tax Court
judge, stated that the reason that the Tax Court is looking for ways to
fix the problems that Ballard revealed is because "[w]e just want to
do everything that we can to make sure we are opening the process..
. [w]e're not trying to conceal anything. ' 250 The Tax Court "looked
for the trial judges' initial reports in the 923 cases that had been heard
by special trial judges but passed on to higher judges for approval
since 1983, when the court stopped releasing the trial judges' initial
reports. '' 251  Only 117 of these special trial judge reports were
actually located and sent in the mail to taxpayers. Of the 117 cases
that were located, the Tax Court determined that "[t]he initial
recommendation and the final decision differed in 4 of the 117
cases." 25 2 Adding the differing report of Ballard, the rate of differing
reports is around 5%. This means that, of the 804 still missing
reports, it is likely that there are thirty-four cases that have a final
decision that differs from the initial special trial report. But, without
these reports, there is no way of knowing how many changes were
actually made.
249. Id.
250. Story, supra note 228.
251. Id.
252. Id.
How the tax court process will work in the future is currently
under quite a bit of scrutiny; therefore, one might expect some
changes to the procedures used in the tax court. A more troubling
issue at this point is how the tax court will deal with the cases that
were already decided, where the reports were kept secret, but
deference was not give to the special trial judge report.253 While this
issue is currently being looked into by the Congressional Ways and
Means Committee, Tax Court judges, tax court attorneys, and
administrative law professors, do not know "what recourse, if any,
parties in these cases have today. 254
In Ballard, the changed report was found during the appellate
process, so a result change was simple. Norman R. Williams, an
administrative law professor at Willamette University College of
Law said: "We're never going to be able to swear those judges under
oath and ask them, 'What went on here? .. . The party's going to be
left in a position of speculating whether it was an open collaborative
process versus the tax court judge just dictating the decision. ' 255 One
creative solution recommended by the attorney of one of the
taxpayers who had a differing report is to "permit people with
differing reports to choose which one they want to be followed. 256
The Tax Court's willing attitude to follow the mandates of the
Supreme Court and take away any aspect of secrecy will most likely
lead to creative solutions favoring complete disclosure.
B. Impact on Other Administrative Courts and Agencies.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari of Ballard even though
there was no split between the circuits. Although it is not possible to
know the full reasons the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it is
likely that the Court saw that Ballard's impact could be so strong that




Josh 0. Ungerman, a lawyer representing a couple who received one of the
newly released reports, said Congress should permit people with differing reports
to choose which one they want to be followed. He said his clients, Douglas P. and
Deborah J. Snow, who now live outside Chicago, [wrongly] paid about $84,000 in
taxes and penalties to the I.R.S. in the early 1990's. Id.
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"the whole administrative array of the federal government" is
affected by its outcome. 25 7 "The implications of this case stretch far
beyond the Tax Court context.,
258
1. Interpretation of Agency Rules
In balancing between an agency's ability to have deference and
authority to write and interpret its own rules without Article III court
interference and a party's ability to see what their initial findings of
fact are so they have confidence in the administrative procedure and
are able to make a meaningful appeal, agency deference is lost. The
Eleventh Circuit's decision reflects what most courts will likely take
from Ballard, that "[t]he Tax Court, like all other decision making
tribunals, is obligated to follow its own Rules. ' 259 What the Eleventh
Circuit failed to acknowledge, however, is that the Tax Court felt as
though it was following its own rules and had been since 1983. The
reality for all other administrative agencies and tribunals is that it "is
obligated to follow [the Supreme Court's interpretation of] its own
Rules. 2
60
A possible solution to interference with agency rule interpretation
is to revise and make clear existing and future rules. If agency rules
are clear to the agency and to the court, Ballard will have little to no
effect on the agency.
2. Due Process
The Justices stopped short of ruling on the Due Process issue. 261
This is certain to come up in the future if either the Tax Court262 or
any agency that would like to rewrite its rules to allow an inferior
257. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 8. Although the case only
directly affects the Tax Court by forcing it upon remand to interpret its rules in a
particular way, the ability of administrative agencies and courts to make their own
rules and interpret them are threatened in this case. Additionally, the public's
confidence in the administrative process is tested by this case as well. Id.
258. Id
259. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Ballard, 540 U.S. at 46).
260. Id
261. Ballard, 544 U.S. at 73 (citing Morgan, 298 U.S. at 478).
262. Based on their reaction to Ballard, this does not seem likely.
officer to keep its fact finding determinations secret. The majority,
together with the concurring opinion, stated that if the Tax Court
Rules allowed the initial reports to remain secret, following that rule
might not be a due process violation and would therefore be
permitted by the Supreme Court.263
However, the petitioners' argued that it is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of Due Process if a lower level judge does not
reveal their findings of fact.264 To argue that it is not a Due Process
violation, the court will likely compare the position of the judge (or
employee) to a similar party.265 The closer one can be compared to a
magistrate judge in their duties, the more likely it is that there will be
a violation of Due Process. 26 6 But, if the position seems more like a
law clerk, it will be considered purely an internal deliberation and
will not be a violation of Due Process. Some factors a court may
look at to find that a lower level judge is actually an "employee"
might include: duties, authority to make final decisions, length of
position, what appellate procedures are used, and the internal aspects
of the job. The closer an agency is to performing "internal
deliberation," the less likely there will be a Due Process violation.
Although it is not likely to happen, if the Tax Court does change
its rules to allow a special trial judge's report to remain secret, there
will likely be Due Process violation. The Supreme Court appeared to
compare the special trial judge's responsibilities to a magistrate
judge's that does require a publishing of lower level reports. 267
Further, it does not appear in any of the Ballard briefs or opinions
that there are any good reasons for keeping the records secret. While
there is a strong policy argument to allow secrecy so the Tax Court
can interpret its own rules, the argument for secrecy beyond
deference was not discussed nor given any weight.
Based on Kennedy's concurrence, it seems practical that an
agency might be able to amend its rules to ensure there is not a Due
263. See supra notes 199-211 and 124-198.
264. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Federation of Independent Business
Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Ballard, 544 U.S. at 40 (No. 03-134) at
6.
265. See supra, notes 73-98.
266. Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1030 (stating that a special trial court judge is
similar to a magistrate judge).
267. See supra notes 75-78.
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Process violation. One possible way an agency could do this is to
require that the inferior fact finder file an affidavit stating that the
regular judge's report is actually adopting, modifying, rejecting, or
giving deference to its report as required by the agency's rules. As
long as there is some assurance that the parties' Due Process is not
violated, it seems possible that an agency could adopt rules that are
not completely transparent.
C. Societal Impact
While this case will have minimal impact on a person who is not
pursuing some type of administrative relief, those who hear or read
about the case will likely have more "confidence in the fairness of the
entire system of Article I courts and administrative agencies." '268 For
those who are either part of or are contemplating Tax Court litigation,
there will be more reading material available for them and their
attorneys. The initial reports of those 104 cases that were found are
now available, the 600 plus page report published in Ballard is
available and all special trial judge initial reports will be available to
read in the future. The parties will also feel a sense of relief
throughout the proceedings with the lower level judge because they
know that they can look at their findings and appeal them. As seen in
Ballard, there was a great deal of frustration that the parties did not
know whether the final decision was a correct one because it was not
available to them. Now, the parties can rest easy knowing that they
can read and challenge the lower level judge's decision.
V. CONCLUSION
From an administrative agency's perspective, Ballard appears to
be an unfair case; the right for the Tax Court to interpret its own rules
was taken away or at least sufficiently diminished. From the public's
perspective, Ballard ensures less secrecy and a fair trial. The impact
of Ballard on administrative agencies and Article I courts will be
significant. The amount of deference given to inferior officer's
findings of fact will be increased; more work will be created because
the tendency will be to publish more than less to remain transparent;
268. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 8.
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agency rules will be interpreted more readily by Article III courts
with less deference to the agency interpretation; and Due Process
violations of an inferior officer will likely come up in the future as
this issue was left undecided. Ballard alters the road ahead for all
administrative agencies.

